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Abstract
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which
the trivial n approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possi-
ble. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than n approxi-
mate, where n is the number of agents. The problems we study are
the min-max variant of the shortest path and the (directed) minimum
spanning tree mechanism design problems. In these procurement auc-
tions, agents own the edges of a network, and the corresponding edge
costs are private. Instead of the total weight of the subnetwork, in the
min-max variant we aim to minimize the maximum agent cost.
1 Introduction
One of the central issues in algorithmic mechanism design concerns the in-
terplay between optimization and incentives. Roughly speaking, one would
like to compute a solution which optimizes a function that depends on some
private information held by the agents. In general, agents may find it con-
venient to misreport this information, and therefore optimization becomes a
critical issue. To overcome this problem, one should design a truthful mech-
anism, that is, a combination of an algorithm and a suitable payment rule
such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents.1
1Throughout this work we assume the standard quasi-linear utilities, meaning that each
agent’s utility is equal to the difference between the payment received and the private cost
associated to the chosen outcome.
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In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [21] considered how well truth-
ful mechanisms can solve a given optimization problem. They view a mech-
anism as an abstraction of a “distributed protocol” which involves various
self-interested parties (agents), a typical scenario in Internet applications.
The protocol is required to optimize some function, but also needs to pro-
vide suitable incentives to the agents to make sure that they cannot profit
from manipulating the protocol. Consider the following simple problem:
Shortest path (auction) [21]. In a communication network, we would
like to establish a path between two distinguished nodes having minimal
total length (sum of the costs of the links forming this path). Each link of
the network is controlled by an entity (agent) who has a private cost for
having her link used to connect the two nodes. Without any compensation
(payment), agents have an incentive to misreport their own cost (i.e., report
a very high cost so that their link is not selected).
Problems like the one above admit a truthful mechanism through the
standard VCG construction. This may not always be the case. Indeed,
Nisan and Ronen [21] identified two types of optimization problems:
• Utilitarian (min-sum) problems. These are the problems where the
goal is to minimize the sum of all agents’ costs.
• Non-utilitarian (min-max) problems. Here the goal is to minimize the
maximum cost incurred by the agents, as opposed to the sum.
They showed that, while all utilitarian problems admit an exact mecha-
nism using the standard VCG construction, there are simple and natural
non-utilitarian (min-max) problems for which no truthful mechanism can
guarantee the optimum. Specifically, they considered the following min-max
problem:
Unrelated machines scheduling [21]. We have a set of jobs to be sched-
uled on n unrelated machines (agents). Each machine has a type which
specifies the processing time (cost) for each of the jobs on this machine.
These costs are private (known to machine i only), and an allocation of
the jobs to machines determines the completion time of that machine (sum
of processing times of allocated jobs). The goal is to return an allocation
minimizing the makespan, that is, minimizing the maximum cost among all
machines.
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They showed that even for just two machines, no truthful mechanism
can be better than 2-approximate2, while a trivial n-approximation can be
obtained via the VCG mechanism,3 and thus the case of two machines is
tight. They conjecture that the trivial upper bound is the correct answer
for this problem:
Conjecture (Nisan-Ronen): No truthful mechanism for un-
related machines scheduling can have an approximation ratio that
is smaller than n.
This quite natural and well studied optimization problem suggests that in-
centives do have a negative impact on the performance guarantee: Despite
being NP-hard, one can compute arbitrarily good approximate solutions in
polynomial time. In contrast, no truthful mechanism can be better than
2-approximate, even for two machines and even if running in exponential
time. Unfortunately, the exact efficiency loss is still unclear, as the conjec-
ture above is still open even for three machines, with a large gap between
the upper and the lower bound (see related work below):
(1) There is a trivial n-approximation using the VCG mechanism, while
the best known lower bound is only a small constant.
(2) The conjecture holds if one makes additional assumptions on the class
of mechanisms.
Though the latter result supports the conjecture above (showing that natural
mechanisms cannot improve VCG for this problems), the following basic
question remains open:
How much is lost because of truthfulness?
Interestingly, similar state of the art holds for analogous non-utilitarian
(min-max) problems.
1.1 Our contribution
We show that the following very simple and natural problems do not admit
any truthful mechanism whose approximation is better than n, where n is
the number of agents:
2Here c-approximation means that the mechanism returns an allocation whose
makespan is at most c times the optimal makespan for the given input (reported costs).
3Their MinWork mechanism is the VCG mechanism minimizing the sum of all agents
costs. This implies that every job is allocated to the fastest machine for that job, which
turns out to be an n-approximation of the optimal makespan.
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Min-max path. We are given a weighted graph and two distinguished
nodes s and t, and we would like to find the path connecting them which
minimizes the maximum cost over the agents. Here the cost of an agent is
equal to the sum of the weights of her selected edges, i.e., her share of the
path’s weight. This agent cost is the same as in the shortest path (auction)
problem [21] when the agents have several edges.
Min-max directed MST. We are given a directed weighted graph and
one distinguished node s, and we would like to find the directed spanning
tree rooted in s which minimizes the maximum cost over the agents, where
the cost of an agent is the same as in the previous problem.
We prove the following two negative results about the approximability
that truthful mechanisms can achieve for the problems above:
Theorem 1. No truthful mechanism for the min-max path problem can be
better than n-approximate.
Theorem 2. No truthful mechanism for the min-max directed MST problem
can be better than n-approximate.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first examples for which there
is a strong separation between truthful approximations and non-truthful
ones. Note that these results hold without any additional assumption on
the mechanism (including its running time). This gives an unconditional
lower bound based solely on truthfulness. A trivial n-approximation can be
obtained by simply running the VCG mechanism: A shortest path (respec-
tively minimum spanning tree) is an n-approximation of the min-max path
(respectively, min-max directed MST). Thus n is a tight bound for truthful
mechanisms in both problems.
The merit of this result is the simplicity of the problem and of the proof.
Specifically, in both problems, the agents’ costs for a solution are the same
as in the shortest-path problem with agents owning several edges (sum of the
costs of chosen edges). In the auction terminology, we are in a simple case
of no externalities, meaning that agents care only about the items that they
get (which of their edges are chosen). Many of the interesting problems are
of this sort, and the main difficulty here is that one cannot invoke Roberts
Theorem saying that truthfulness implies that the mechanism must be an
affine maximizer (in the VCG family).
As we discuss in the next section, all prior inapproximability results for
other non-utilitarian min-max problems either (1) are significantly weaker
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as only a small constant factor on the inapproximability is known or (2) they
only apply to certain classes of mechanisms as they are based on additional
assumptions. As we discuss in Section 4, our problems can be thought of as
a generalization of the unrelated machines scheduling problem.
1.2 Related work
Arguably, the most general mechanism design technique is VCG and its sim-
ple generalization known as affine maximizers (“weighted VCG”). Roughly
speaking, these mechanisms maximize the weighted social welfare (sum of
agents valuations) over a fixed subset of the possible solutions. Equiva-
lently, for problems involving private costs, these mechanisms minimize the
weighted social cost (sum of agents costs). These constructions are gen-
eral in the sense that they require no assumption on the agents’ domain,
that is, they can be applied to unrestricted domains.4 A famous result by
Roberts [22] says that affine maximizers are the only truthful mechanism on
unrestricted domains.
For most of the interesting problems, truthful mechanisms other than
VCG may still be possible because the problem deals inherently with a re-
stricted domain. A classical example is the no externalities condition in com-
binatorial auctions which says that the agents valuations depend uniquely
on the items they get, and not on who gets the other items. For multi-
unit auctions there are truthful non-VCG mechanisms that outperform any
VCG mechanism for the same problem [10]. In a one-dimensional or single-
parameter setting, valuations are linear in the number of items allocated (the
private parameter being the valuation for a single unit). These problems are
usually easier and truthfulness is less stringent than in the multi-dimensional
case (see e.g. Myerson [20] and Archer and Tardos [1]). Truthfulness can be
characterized by a so called monotonicity condition (see e.g., Rochet [23],
Bikhchandani et al. [4], Saks and Yu [24]). Intuitively, this is a property
of the algorithm (allocation rule) and it prescribes how the allocation of an
agent should change if only this agent changes her reported type. In that
sense, this condition is local as it focuses on one agent at a time. Lavi et al.
[15] presented an alternative proof of Roberts’ theorem using monotonicity
(and an extra condition called “player decisiveness”).
All known lower bounds for the unrelated machines scheduling (and oth-
ers) are based on the above mentioned monotonicity condition. The diffi-
culty in the unrelated machine scheduling problem is that its domain is
4This is the case where, for a finite set A of alternatives or outcomes, each agent i has
a valuation which can be any function vi : A → <.
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neither one-dimensional nor unrestricted. The problem becomes interesting
already for n = 3 machines, and the gap between the best upper bound and
the best lower bound gets wider as n grows. Nisan and Ronen [21] proved
that n-approximation can be obtained via the VCG mechanism, and that
for n = 2 no mechanism can be better than 2-approximate. This has trig-
gered a fairly large number of papers that focused on this problem and some
variants [8, 13, 2, 19, 6]. Christodoulou et al. [8] showed a lower bound of
1 +
√
2 ' 2.41 for n = 3 machines. Koutsoupias and Vidali [13] proved a
lower bound of 1+ϕ ' 2.618 for arbitrarily many machines (i.e., for n→∞).
These are the best known lower bounds for this problem, and stronger lower
bounds have been obtained only by making additional assumptions on the
mechanism. Specifically, a lower bound of n has been obtained under the
following various assumptions: Nisan and Ronen [21] considered mecha-
nisms whose payments are additive in the jobs; Mu’alem and Schapira [19]
considered strong monotonicity, a stronger condition than the one character-
izing truthfulness; Ashlagi et al. [2] focused on anonymous mechanisms, i.e.,
mechanisms whose allocation does not depend on the names of the agents.
Christodoulou et al. [6] studied the fractional version of the unrelated
machines problem. They proved that still there is a lower bound of 2− 1n for
this seemingly simpler problem, and obtained a slightly better upper bound
of n+12 compared to the original problem. Similarly to the original problem,
if one makes the additional assumption on the mechanism, namely that the
algorithm is task independent5, then a matching lower bound of n+12 holds.
Another problem which exhibits a similar structure to the unrelated
machines is the inter-domain routing problem by Mu’alem and Shapira [19].
Here, we have a graph whose nodes are the agents, and the solutions are
the trees directed towards a destination node; each solution determines the
amount of traffic that each of node i receives from its neighbors; each node i
has a per-unit cost for each of the neighbors, and the goal is to minimize the
maximum cost among the nodes. Again, we have a multi-dimensional non-
utilitarian (min-max) problem for which the best lower bound is a small
constant and the best upper bound is n using the VCG mechanism [19].
Gamzu [11] proved a lower bound of 2, which is the best known lower bound
for this problem and it also applies to randomized mechanisms.
The only significant improvements on the upper bounds have been ob-
tained for single-parameter or two-values domains. Archer and Tardos [1]
showed that, unlike in the unrelated machines, the related machines case
5This condition requires that the allocation of a task depends only on the processing
times of this task on the machines, and not on the other tasks’ processing times.
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admits an exact (exponential time) truthful mechanism, and a constant
approximation can be obtained by a randomized polynomial-time truthful
mechanism. Christodoulou and Kova´cs [9] even obtained a polynomial-time
deterministic truthful approximation scheme, that is, for any  > 0 there is a
truthful polynomial-time mechanism which computes a (1 + )-approximate
solution. Mu’alem and Shapira [19] observed that the single-parameter ver-
sion of their inter-domain routing problem also admits an exact truthful
mechanism (as opposed to the multi-dimensional version). Lavi and Swamy
[16] gave a truthful 3-approximation mechanism for the unrelated machines
restricted to two-values domains, i.e., when the cost of executing a job on
a machine can be only “low” or “high”. Their proof uses (in a non-trivial
way) the cycle monotonicity condition by Rochet [23]. Yu [26] extended the
result to two-range values where the costs belong to two ranges which are
“sufficiently far apart”.
Several papers considered the power of randomization for this problem,
essentially showing that the situation is not much different. In particular,
Mu’alem and Shapira [19] proved a lower bound of 2 − 1n , meaning that
it is still impossible to achieve exact solutions (note that this is the same
lower bound for the fractional version). Lu and Yu [18, 17] gave a ran-
domized mechanism with approximation 0.8368n and n+52 , depending on
whether we consider universally truthful or truthful in expectation mech-
anisms. Intuitively, the former is a stronger requirement which says that
truth-telling is a dominant strategy, even if agents would know the random
bits, while the latter needs agents to care about their expected utility. For
a separation result in a subclass of the two-values domains in unrelated ma-
chines see Auletta et al. [3]. Like for deterministic mechanisms, the known
upper bounds for randomized mechanisms are optimal if one restricts to
task-independent mechanisms (n+12 is a lower bound [18]).
Kova´cs and Vidali [14] studied mechanisms that satisfy strong mono-
tonicity for the unrelated machines scheduling domain. They provide char-
acterizations of mechanisms satisfying also some additional requirements
for the case of two jobs. Christodoulou et al. [7] characterized the class of
truthful mechanisms for two machines. In both cases, the resulting class
is a wider class than VCG/affine minimizers, which suggests that trying
to extend Roberts’ theorem to the scheduling domain in order to prove a
lower bound might be hopeless. Indeed, only for the case of two jobs and
two machines truthful mechanisms coincide with VCG mechanisms/affine
minimizers [7].
Chawla et al. [5] and Giannakopoulos and Kyropoulou [12] considered a
Bayesian setting where the agents types are drawn according to a certain
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probability distribution.
2 The two problems and truthfulness
Both problems we consider share the following features:
• We are given a weighted (directed or undirected) graph G = (V,E).
• The edges are partitioned among n agents 1, . . . , n, where each agent
i owns a subset Ei of edges, and each edge e belongs to exactly one
agent.
• The cost (weight) of edge e is denoted by
ti(e)
where ti is the type of agent i owning this edge. The type of agent i
is private knowledge, and each agent i can report a possibly different
type.
• We have a set X of feasible solutions, where each feasible solution
x ∈ X consists of a subset of edges. Any feasible solution x costs
agent i the sum of the weights (costs) of her edges included in the
solution,
ti(x) =
∑
e∈x∩Ei
ti(e) .
• The goal is to find a feasible solution x∗ minimizing the maximum
agent cost cost(x, t) = maxi ti(x) where t = (ti)i=1,...,n, that is, x
∗ ∈
arg minx∈X cost(x, t).
We call problems with the above structure graph problems, regardless of the
last item (the optimization criteria). The main differences between the two
problems we consider are: (i) whether the graph is undirected or not, and
(ii) the structure of the set X of feasible solutions (i.e., whether a solution
x ∈ X corresponds to a path or a tree in G).
Definition 3 (min-max path and min-max directed MST). In the min-
max path problem, the graph is undirected, and the set of feasible solutions
consists of all paths connecting two given nodes. In the min-max directed
minimum spanning tree (MST), the graph is directed, and the feasible so-
lutions consist of all directed trees (i.e., arborescences) connecting a given
vertex (the root) to all other nodes (there is a directed path from the root to
every other node).
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We conclude with the formal definition of a truthful mechanism.
Definition 4 (truthful mechanism). A mechanism (A,P ) is truthful if
truth-telling is a dominant strategy (utility maximizing) for all agents. That
is, for any vector t˜ = (t˜1, . . . , t˜n) of costs reported by the agents, for any i,
and for any true cost ti of agent i,
Pi(t)− ti(x) ≥ Pi(t˜)− ti(x˜),
where t = (t˜1, . . . , t˜i−1, ti, t˜i+1, . . . , t˜n), x = A(t), and x˜ = A(t˜).
2.1 Implications of truthfulness
In this section, we state the main basic properties that any truthful mecha-
nism must satisfy for our problems.
Definition 5 (monotone algorithm). Algorithm A is monotone if, for any
t, for any i, and for any t′i,
ti(x) + t
′
i(x
′) ≤ ti(x′) + t′i(x) (1)
where x = A(t) and x′ = A(t′i, t−i).
The following is a well-known result (see e.g., [4, 19]).
Proposition 6. If a mechanism (A,P ) is truthful then A is monotone.
From the above property, one can easily derive the following condition
that must be satisfied by any truthful mechanism.
Lemma 7. Let (A,P ) be a truthful mechanism for a graph problem. Let t
be a vector of reported types and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be an agent. For t the
mechanism selects a subset Ai(t) of the edges owned by i. Now consider
types in which these edges are less costly, while all non-selected edges of i
are more costly:
t′i(e) <ti(e) for e ∈ Ai(t) , (2)
t′i(e) >ti(e) for e 6∈ Ai(t) . (3)
Then the mechanism must select the same subset of edges of i, provided all
other agents’ types are unchanged, i.e.,
Ai(t) = Ai(t
′
i, t−i) . (4)
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Figure 1: The chain graph for n = 3 agents.
Proof. Consider the symmetric difference S ∪ S′ between the edges owned
by i selected in the two solutions, where S := Ai(t) \ Ai(t′) and S′ :=
Ai(t
′) \ Ai(t). We shall prove that both S and S′ must be empty. If S is
non-empty, then (2) implies
ti(S) > t
′
i(S) . (5)
Similarly, if S′ is non-empty, then (3) implies
t′i(S
′) > ti(S′) . (6)
We thus have ti(x)− ti(x′)+ t′i(x′)− t′i(x) = ti(S)− ti(S′)+ t′i(S′)− t′i(S) > 0
if at least one of S and S′ is non-empty. This contradicts the monotonicity
condition (1), and thus (A,P ) cannot be truthful (Proposition 6).
2.2 Min-max path (Proof of Theorem 1)
We construct a graph chain as follows (see Figure 1). Consider the con-
catenation of ` blocks B1, . . . , B`, where each block Bk consists of n parallel
edges connecting uk to uk+1, one for each agent. We denote by t
k
i the cost
of the edge eki of agent i in block k. We shall specify the number ` of blocks
and the costs tki later in the proof.
We now transform chain into another graph expandedchain in the
following way (see Figure 2). In every block Bk, each edge e
k
i of agent i is
replaced by a path eki,1, . . . , e
k
i,n of n edges. Edge e
k
i,j belongs to agent j and
the costs are as follows. Edge eki,i owned by i has the original cost of e
k
i ,
and all the other n− 1 edges in this path have a tiny cost . We name the
resulting graph expandedchain.
Lemma 8. Let (A,P ) be a truthful mechanism, and let t and t′i be defined
as in Lemma 7. Then, on expandedchain, the algorithm must return the
same solution on these two types, i.e.,
A(t) = A(t′i, t−i) .
10
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Figure 2: Transforming chain into expandedchain for n = 3 agents: Each
edge in a block of chain is replaced by a path with n edges, one for each
agent.
Proof. We show that A(t) and A(t′i, t−i) must select the same path in each
block of expandedchain. Fix a block Bk and notice that each of the n
paths contains exactly one edge eki from agent i. By Lemma 7, e
k
i must
also be selected in A(t′i, t−i), which forces the same path in this block to be
selected as well (and no other paths are selected because the solution must
be a simple path).
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose all costs are equal to 1 in the chain
graph (before the transformation) and consider the corresponding graph
expandedchain.
Notice that the algorithm must select exactly one simple path between
uk and uk+1. Let `i denote the number of these paths in expandedchain
that contain an edge of cost 1 owned by agent i. Without loss of generality,
assume
0 ≤ `n ≤ `n−1 ≤ · · · ≤ `2 ≤ `1
by simply renaming the agents. Then, since all ` blocks contain one selected
path,
`1 ≥ `/n.
Now iteratively repeat the following transformation on the costs ti for agents
i = 2, . . . , n:
• Set the cost of all edges of agent i selected in the solution to 0, and
increase by  the cost of edges of i not in the solution.
By Lemma 8, the solution cannot change and therefore, for the final types
t∗, the cost of agent 1 is still at least `1, thus implying
cost(A(t∗), t∗) ≥ `1 .
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However, the optimum for this instance t∗ would be to distribute these `1
paths among the n agents, as each of the other paths contributes at most 
to the cost of the solution:
opt(t∗) ≤
⌈
`1
n
⌉
(1 + ) + 2` ≤
(
`1
n
+ 1
)
(1 + ) + 2` ,
where the term 2` accounts for the fact that a solution always selects, in
each of the ` blocks, at most one edge of initial cost  per agent, and the
new cost is at most 2. By taking  = 12` this implies
opt(t∗) ≤ `1
n
+
`1
2n`
+ 1 +
1
2`
+ 1 ≤ `1
n
+ 4 .
We thus have
cost(A(t∗), t∗)
opt(t∗)
≥ n · `1
`1 + 4n
= n− 4n
2
`1 + 4n
> n− 4n
2
`1
≥ n− 4n
3
`
.
Taking ` arbitrarily large gives a lower bound of n− δ, for any δ > 0.
3 Min-max directed MST (Proof of Theorem 2)
The min-max directed MST problem is similar to the min-max path problem
with few differences: (i) We have a weighted directed graph G; (ii) A solution
is a directed spanning tree (arborescence) x rooted at some distinguished
node s.
3.1 Adapting the reduction
In the proof we start from the same chain of blocks as in the proof of Theo-
rem 1, where edges are now directed from uk to uk+1, but the transformation
is slightly different (see Figure 3 for the intuition).
Specifically, the left block consists of n parallel edges directed from left
to right, each of them belonging to a different agent. The i-th parallel edge
in each block is then replaced by a path of n rightward edges plus n − 1
leftward edges as follows:
1. The first rightward edge belongs to agent i and its cost is the same as
the cost in the left graph (parallel edges).
2. The remaining n − 1 rightward edges belong to agent (i mod n) +
1, (i+1 mod n)+1, . . . , (i+n−2 mod n)+1. This order is the same
across all blocks (this will be crucial in the following). All these edges
have cost .
12
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Figure 3: Adapting the reduction to directed MST for n = 3 agents.
3. Each of the previous n−1 edges is paired with an edge directed in the
opposite direction, also of cost .
The whole construction consists of again a chain of ` blocks, where block
Bk consists of the n parallel paths connecting uk with uk+1. The leftmost
node in the first block, i.e., u1, is the root.
Definition 9. For any block j and any agent i, we define fullpath(i, j)
as the unique path of n rightward edges, as defined in Items 1-2 above, in
which the first edge is owned by agent i. We say that the mechanism selects
agent i in block j if fullpath(i, j) is selected.
Note that, in general, it is possible to select more than one agent per
block. However, due to the presence of the leftward edges, there exists
always a feasible solution that selects only one agent per block.
Proof of Theorem 2. We are now in a position to apply a similar type of
analysis as we did in the proof of Theorem 1. Initially all costs are equal to 1
in the directed chain graph (before the transformation). Since the algorithm
must select a full path in each block, there must be an agent i∗ which has
been selected in at least `i∗ ≥ `/n blocks.
Without loss of generality (as this can be guaranteed by simply renaming
the agents), we assume i∗ = 1. Notice that fullpath(i∗, j) traverses the
edges owned by agents 1, 2, . . . , n in left-to-right order.
Now we iteratively repeat the following transformation on the costs ti of
agent i, where agents are considered in decreasing order from n to 2:
• For the current agent i, reduce the cost of all edges of i taken in the
solution to 0, and increase the cost of non-selected edges by .
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Intuitively, this particular order will ensure that, after each transformation,
the mechanism must still select agent i∗ = 1 in each of the `1 blocks where
it was initially selected.
Claim 10. For any block j where fullpath(1, j) has been initially selected,
the following holds. After the k-th step of the above transformation, (that
is, at the beginning if k = 0 or after modifying the edge costs of the edges
owned by agent n−k+1, if k > 0), the mechanism must still select all edges
in fullpath(1, j) that belong to agents 1, 2, . . . , n− k.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k, where the base case k = 0 is trivial
since initially the mechanism has selected all edges in fullpath(1, j). As
for the inductive step, suppose that after the k-th step the edge of agent
n − k is still selected (inductive hypothesis). The (k + 1)-th step consists
of lowering the costs of all edges of agent n − (k + 1) + 1 = n − k which
are currently selected, while increasing the cost of the edges owned by agent
n − k not currently selected. By Lemma 7, the edge of agent n − k in
fullpath(1, j) must be selected also after the transformation. Since the
feasible solution must be a directed spanning tree, this forces all previous
edges in fullpath(1, j) to be selected, i.e., those from agents 1, 2, . . . , n −
k − 1. That is, the claim holds for k + 1.
The above claim shows that, after the last iteration, we still have agent
i∗ = 1 with a cost at least `i∗ ≥ `/n. However, in the modified costs t∗, the
optimum is at most
opt(t∗) ≤
⌈
`i∗
n
⌉
(1 + ) + 4n` ≤
(
`i∗
n
+ 1
)
(1 + ) + 4n` . (7)
This is so because, in every block j′ where the mechanism initially selected
some agent i′ 6= i∗, fullpath(i′, j′) has cost at most , due to the single
edge of i∗ whose initial cost was . Moreover, each agent has at most 2n`
edges of initial cost , and after the transformation this cost is at most 2.
Then, the first inequality in (7) can be obtained by considering the solution
in which the `i∗ blocks selecting i
∗ are redistributed evenly among all agents.
By taking  = 14`n , (7) implies
opt(t∗) ≤ `i∗
n
+
`i∗
4`n2
+ 1 +
1
4`n
+ 1 ≤ `i∗
n
+ 4 .
The remainder of the proof is identical to that of Theorem 1.
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4 Conclusion and open questions
It is worth noticing that our problems can be thought of as a generalization
of the unrelated machines scheduling. Indeed, by considering the chain
graph (see Fig. 1), one can think of each tji as the cost to process job j
on machine i from the scheduling problem. Any solution for the min-max
path problem corresponds to a job scheduling with the same makespan. For
the min-max directed MST problem, a similar argument applies since every
(directed) tree on this graph is also a path.
An important point in our proofs is the role of the combinatorial struc-
ture, in particular how we expand chain into expandedchain. In a nut-
shell, it allows to control how the solution changes when a single player cost
changes (cf Lemma 8 and Claim 10 for the two reductions, respectively). In
several proofs of lower bound results for unrelated machines scheduling, this
is done by assuming extra properties of the mechanism. The lower bound by
Mu’alem and Schapira [19] is based on strong monotonicity, which implies
that the algorithm is somehow breaking ties among the solutions in a fixed
manner.
The following two natural questions are still open:
Question 1: Is it possible to extend our lower bounds to randomized mech-
anisms?
Question 2: Is it possible to extend the lower bound for min-max directed
MST to the undirected case?
We do not know the answer to either question. The main reason is that
certain key properties of our reduction seem difficult to obtain. Regard-
ing the first question, randomized mechanisms for min-max path could be
studied by looking at the fractional version of the problem, i.e., the one in
which we send a unit of flow from the source to the destination (this flow
can be divided arbitrarily). Now the monotonicity condition on our reduc-
tion does not guarantee anymore that the solution does not change under
certain conditions (Lemma 8). Regarding the second question, the mono-
tonicity condition of the min-max directed MST problem is ensured by the
direction of the edges and again it is lost in the undirected case (Claim 10).
Furthermore, we observe that our reductions use few values and, in fact,
they would fall in the class of two-range values studied by Yu [26] for unre-
lated machines scheduling. Since Yu [26] shows that constant-approximation
is indeed possible in this restriction, we obtain a separation between the
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scheduling problem and our two min-max problems for such restricted do-
mains.
Finally, we remark that the min-max path problem can be approximated
efficiently in a non-truthful manner (thus complexity is not an issue). In
particular, there exists a polynomial-time approximation scheme6 for any
constant number of agents. This follows easily from a result by Tsaggouris
et al. [25] on the multi-objective version of the shortest-path problem (see
Appendix A) and it is the same result that holds for scheduling a constant
number of unrelated machines. Whether the same holds for the min-max
MST is an interesting open question.
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A Complexity considerations
In this section, we show that the optimization (non-strategic) version of the
min-max path problem can be approximated arbitrarily well in polynomial
time, for any constant number of agents.
Theorem 11. For any constant number of agents, there exists a polynomial-
time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the min-max path problem.
We employ a result by Tsaggouris et al. [25] on the multi-objective version
of the shortest path problem. In this version, each edge e has associated an
n-dimensional vector w(e) = (w1(e), . . . , wn(e)). Each solution x has an
n-dimensional cost vector c(x) = (c1(x), . . . , cn(x)) with ci(x) being the cost
computed with respect to the ith component of weights w(e),
ci(x) =
∑
e∈x
wi(s) .
One can see that our min-max path is a special case of this multi-objective
optimization problem: For an edge e owned by i, consider the vector
w(e) = (0, . . . , 0, wi(e), 0, . . . , 0) with wi(e) = ti(e) (8)
which then implies
ci(x) = ti(x) .
The set P of Pareto solutions consists of all solutions that are not domi-
nated: For every x ∈ P, there is no other solution x′ such that ci(x′) ≤ ci(x)
for all i, and one of these inequalities being strict.
Definition 12 ((1 + )-Pareto set). The set P of (1 + )-Pareto solutions
is a set of solutions such that, for every x ∈ P, there is some y in P such
that ci(y) ≤ (1 + )ci(x) for all i.
Let P be the Pareto solutions and P be the (1 + )-Pareto set. Let ν
and m denote the number of nodes and edges in the graph, and n be the
number of agents as above. Another key parameter is the ratio between the
maximum and minimum cost of an edge, i.e.,
Rw = max
e
max
k,l
wk(e)/wl(e) .
Theorem 13 ([25]). P can be computed in time O
(
νm
(
ν log(νRw)

)n−1)
.
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Note that, in the above encoding of our problem (8), R is actually un-
bounded, which makes the above theorem of no use. We shall therefore
make a minor modifications of the weights, by setting the minimum weight
to some suitably small δ > 0 to be specified below:
w′i(e) = max(δ, wi(e)) for all i and e . (9)
(In particular, all 0s of w(e) are replaced by δ which is the minimum weight
in the modified vectors.) In order to specify δ, we make the following ob-
servations. Let SP (t) denote the length of the shortest path (sum of edge
costs) for the original edge costs t. Let also OPT (t) denote the optimum
for the min-max cost for edge costs t. Then
SP (t)
n
≤ OPT (t) ≤ SP (t). (10)
(See Remark 1 below for a proof.) If SP (t) = 0 then this solution is also
the optimum and we are done. Otherwise, we set δ := SP (t)
n2
and remove
all edges e whose cost ti(e), for i being the agent owning edge e, is larger
than SP (t). Let t′ be the instance obtained from t after this transformation.
Now observe the following:
• Any solution that uses some discarded edge would cost at least SP (t),
so it will not be better than the shortest path.
• Any solution x which does not use any discarded edge, has a cost which
is close in both edge weightings:
cost(x, t′) ≤ cost(x, t) + n · δ ≤ cost(x, t) + OPT (t) ,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that any simple path has
at most n edges, and we have increased each edge cost by at most δ;
the second inequality follows from (10) and by our choice of δ.
In particular, the set P ′ of Pareto solutions for the modified weights w′
contains a (1 + )-approximate solution for the original weights w. Since
Rw′ ≤ SP (t)δ = n
2
 , we can apply Theorem 13 and compute the (1 + )-
Pareto set P in polynomial time. Then this set contains a polynomial
number fo solutions. The solution x in P minimizing our cost function
cost(x, t′) = maxi ci(x) is a (1 + )-approximation for the weights w′, and
thus a (1 + )2-approximation for the original weights w. That is, it is a
(1+ )2-approximation for the input t. Since we can choose  > 0 arbitrarily
small, this yields a PTAS.
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B Trivial n-approximation via VCG
It is well known that every min-max problem admits a trivial n-approximate
truthful VCG mechanism (see e.g. Nisan and Ronen [21]). For convenience
of the reader, we repeat here this simple folklore argument. Let OPT (t) be
the min-max optimum for costs t, and SC(t) being the social cost optimum
(sum of agents costs) also with respect to t. By writing both these quantities
according to the agents shares, we have
OPT (t) = max(OPT1(t), . . . , OPTn(t))
where OPTi(t) = ti(x
∗) for x∗ being the solution minimizing the min-max
cost, and
SC(t) = SC1(t) + · · ·+ SCn(t)
where SCi(t) = ti(x) for x being the solution minimizing the social cost.
The solution x minimizing the social cost (output by the VCG mechanism)
has cost
cost(x, t) = max
i
ti(x) = max
i
SCi(t) ≤
∑
i
SCi(t)
≤
∑
i
OPTi(t) ≤ n ·max
i
OPTi(t)
which then implies that x is an n-approximate solution.
Remark 1. The optimum social cost and the min-max optimum are related
according to following two inequalities:
SC(t)
n
≤ OPT (t) ≤ SC(t) . (11)
The first one has been proved above. As for the second inequality, simply
observe that OPT (t) = maxi(OPTi(t)) ≤ maxi(SCi(t)) ≤ SC(t), where the
first inequality is due to the fact that OPT (t) is the optimum for the min-
max. For the min-max path problem, SC(t) is simply the length SP (t) of
the shortest path with respect to edge costs t.
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